Wednesday, February 4, 2009

WCAM: How Inflation Became the Good Guy

Inflation has been an all-purpose bogeyman since the 1970s, but a small amount of inflation comes with a healthy, growing economy. The Federal Reserve focuses on managing inflation, not preventing it. We have written often that we feel the government measures inflation incorrectly, since the Consumer Price Index undervalues food, healthcare and energy costs. As a result, excessive inflation builds for a while before the government acknowledges it, and comes as a surprise, despite our constant measurement and analysis.

But the consumer price index is only one measure of inflation. Another is the Producer Price Index (PPI), which measures inflation faced by people who buy raw materials to create other products. Watching the constant rise of producer prices over the past years, as consumer prices appeared stable, a thoughtful observer sensed that “something’s gotta give.” Add a significant credit crisis, a sudden liquidity crisis, a Fed Chairman who dreads the Great Depression’s deflation, and the table is set for significant inflation, and the possibility of hyperinflation.

The current economic crisis raises the specter of both deflation and hyperinflation for many economists and journalists, and “specter” is the operative word here. Studying deflation and hyperinflation is a little bit like studying Bigfoot and the Loch Ness monster. Deflation and hyperinflation are real, but there is as much lore as evidence in the popular press and on the Internet. In times of crisis, one struggles to separate political agendas and fear mongering from analysis.
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With our currency likely to be dropping in value and our interest rates likely to be moving up (they certainly cannot go down much farther), what should one own?

Real assets and companies that can withstand and benefit from inflation over the long term are good options. Examples include companies with popular, everyday products, like Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ), Cadbury (NYSE: CBY), Clorox (NYSE: CLX), Kimberly Clark (NYSE: KMB), and Molson Coors (NYSE: TAP).

Another opportunity might lie with companies like Automatic Data Processing (NasdaqGS: ADP), which processes payrolls and earns float on the overnight deposits. As interest rates rise, so will ADP’s profits. Payroll processors might experience a dip in volume as layoffs and bankruptcies spread, so investors must consider that risk. Other ports in an inflationary storm usually include real assets like oil, coal, steel, lumber, copper, and gold.
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Thursday, January 29, 2009

Fortune: December 2001 - Warren Buffett on the Stock Market

It's always a decent time to go back and read Mr. Buffett's old thoughts, but now is probably a better time than most.
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To break things down another way, we had three huge, secular bull markets that covered about 44 years, during which the Dow gained more than 11,000 points. And we had three periods of stagnation, covering some 56 years. During those 56 years the country made major economic progress and yet the Dow actually lost 292 points.

How could this have happened? In a flourishing country in which people are focused on making money, how could you have had three extended and anguishing periods of stagnation that in aggregate --leaving aside dividends-- would have lost you money? The answer lies in the mistake that investors repeatedly make--that psychological force I mentioned above: People are habitually guided by the rear-view mirror and, for the most part, by the vistas immediately behind them.
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Now, there was a smart man, who did just about the hardest thing in the world to do. Charles Darwin used to say that whenever he ran into something that contradicted a conclusion he cherished, he was obliged to write the new finding down within 30 minutes. Otherwise his mind would work to reject the discordant information, much as the body rejects transplants. Man's natural inclination is to cling to his beliefs, particularly if they are reinforced by recent experience --a flaw in our makeup that bears on what happens during secular bull markets and extended periods of stagnation.
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Now, if you had read that article in 1979, you would have suffered--oh, how you would have suffered!--for about three years. I was no good then at forecasting the near-term movements of stock prices, and I'm no good now. I never have the faintest idea what the stock market is going to do in the next six months, or the next year, or the next two.

But I think it is very easy to see what is likely to happen over the long term. Ben Graham told us why: "Though the stock market functions as a voting machine in the short run, it acts as a weighing machine in the long run." Fear and greed play important roles when votes are being cast, but they don't register on the scale.

By my thinking, it was not hard to say that, over a 20 -year period, a 9.5% bond wasn't going to do as well as this disguised bond called the Dow that you could buy below par--that's book value--and that was earning 13% on par.

Let me explain what I mean by that term I slipped in there, "disguised bond." A bond, as most of you know, comes with a certain maturity and with a string of little coupons. A 6% bond, for example, pays a 3% coupon every six months.

A stock, in contrast, is a financial instrument that has a claim on future distributions made by a given business, whether they are paid out as dividends or to repurchase stock or to settle up after sale or liquidation. These payments are in effect "coupons." The set of owners getting them will change as shareholders come and go. But the financial outcome for the business' owners as a whole will be determined by the size and timing of these coupons. Estimating those particulars is what investment analysis is all about.

Now, gauging the size of those "coupons" gets very difficult for individual stocks. It's easier, though, for groups of stocks. Back in 1978, as I mentioned, we had the Dow earning 13% on its average book value of $850. The 13% could only be a benchmark, not a guarantee. Still, if you'd been willing then to invest for a period of time in stocks, you were in effect buying a bond--at prices that in 1979 seldom inched above par--with a principal value of $891 and a quite possible 13% coupon on the principal.

How could that not be better than a 9.5% bond? From that starting point, stocks had to outperform bonds over the long term. That, incidentally, has been true during most of my business lifetime. But as Keynes would remind us, the superiority of stocks isn't inevitable. They own the advantage only when certain conditions prevail.
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The tour we've taken through the last century proves that market irrationality of an extreme kind periodically erupts--and compellingly suggests that investors wanting to do well had better learn how to deal with the next outbreak. What's needed is an antidote, and in my opinion that's quantification. If you quantify, you won't necessarily rise to brilliance, but neither will you sink into craziness.

On a macro basis, quantification doesn't have to be complicated at all. Below is a chart, starting almost 80 years ago and really quite fundamental in what it says. The chart shows the market value of all publicly traded securities as a percentage of the country's business--that is, as a percentage of GNP. The ratio has certain limitations in telling you what you need to know. Still, it is probably the best single measure of where valuations stand at any given moment. And as you can see, nearly two years ago the ratio rose to an unprecedented level. That should have been a very strong warning signal.

For investors to gain wealth at a rate that exceeds the growth of U.S. business, the percentage relationship line on the chart must keep going up and up. If GNP is going to grow 5% a year and you want market values to go up 10%, then you need to have the line go straight off the top of the chart. That won't happen.

For me, the message of that chart is this: If the percentage relationship falls to the 70% or 80% area, buying stocks is likely to work very well for you. If the ratio approaches 200%--as it did in 1999 and a part of 2000--you are playing with fire.
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Current value of U.S. stocks (8,519.05) / (Real) GNP (estimated at 12,350) = 69%. I'm not exactly sure if those are the same numbers Buffett uses (if someone else does, let me know) because when using the October 2001 numbers Buffett mentions in the article, I get a Wilshire 5000 value of 9,796.90 divided by a Real GNP number of 9,983.10 = 98%. If I use the October GNP number but the December 7th (last trading day before the article was published) Wilshire value of 10,745.40, we get 108%; both well below the 133% mentioned in the article. So I'm either using the wrong current numbers and data points or backtracking incorrectly. Interestingly, the Wilshire's high was reached on October 9, 2007 at 15,806.69. The Real GNP at the end of October 2007 was 11,799.10, for a market value / GNP of 134%. Here's to hindsight!
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Also, Nick's Rational Angle post listed below mentions the 'Stock Market Capitalization as a Percentage of Nominal GDP' number that Prem Watsa has used in his presentations (average over time is just under 60% -- 2008 started at about 110%).
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Related previous posts:
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Related post from Nick at Rational Angle:
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Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Robert Shiller: Animal Spirits Depend on Trust

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Related books:
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Friday, January 23, 2009

GMO - Jeremy Grantham's 4Q 2008 Letter (Part 1)

With economies and financial markets, it seems that if you stare hard enough and long enough at the fog of battle, you occasionally get a glimpse of what may be going on when a favorable wind blows. This, for me, is decidedly not one of those occasions. It is obvious to all of us that these are momentous days in which government actions may well have make-or-break impact, but my confidence in government and leadership is at a low ebb. (Although I must admit my confidence has increased enormously in recent weeks in all areas outside of finance. Even in finance it has increased a little.) Economic advice for President Obama covers the waterfront, and even the near-consensus case for great stimulus is lacking in historical certainties or intellectual rigor. Everyone seems to be guessing at strategies and outcomes, knowing clearly that the best strategy would have been to have avoided getting into this pickle. The current disaster would have been easy to avoid by making a move against asset bubbles early in their lifecycle. It will, in contrast, be devilishly hard to get out of. But, we are deep in the pickle jar, and it seems likely that, in terms of economic pain, 2009 will be the worst year in the lives of the majority of Americans, Brits, and others. So break a leg, everyone!

It would be helpful at a time like this to have a Quarterly Letter that sounded convinced of something … anything. So I apologize for overtly tickling around the edges. I do not apologize, though, for pointing you to the best thing I have read in The New York Times in a very long time: the article by Lewis and Einhorn does a great job of summarizing where we are and how we got here, as well as offering some helpful advice for the future. My contribution is to address a few peripheral topics that have accumulated over recent quarters as more important topics have dominated.

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Related previous post: NY Times Op-Ed from Michael Lewis and David Einhorn
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Alice Schroeder discusses Warren Buffett and his 1959 Investment in Mid-Continent Tab Card Company

One-on-One with Warren Buffett

The Extended Interview
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Portions of Susie Gharib's interview with Warren Buffett will air in the January 22nd & 23rd broadcasts of NBR. The complete interview is available below. You can also read the
complete transcript.
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Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Oak Value Fund: Investment Adviser’s Review – Q4 2008

“All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark.” - Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Quoting history’s most widely taught treatise of wartime engagement seems appropriate as we reflect upon the recent quarter, and for that matter, the year that was 2008. There is certainly no doubt that 2008 was a battleground for most investors. The events of the last year challenged numerous fundamental assumptions and theories on investing. In investment parlance, correlation across asset classes turned out to be much higher than imagined, volatility reached levels never seen before, governments responded in unexpected ways, and assumptions regarding expected returns were severely challenged. In everyday parlance, everybody got scared at the same time.

Of course, the paradox is that what would appear to make most investors feel better in the short-term (e.g. safety, cash) is not what drives investment performance over time. To the extent that emotion should be allowed to influence investment decisions, it should be in the context of taking advantage of someone else’s emotions. When Mr. Market wants in, he wants in. When he wants out, he wants out. Of late, he has really wanted out!

At Oak Value, we do not invest in a way that just makes us feel better today. We try to minimize the influence of emotions on our investment decisions by always seeking the high ground. After more than two decades in the business of investing, experience has provided us with a good definition of our “high ground.” This recent experience has only served to reinforce our longstanding belief that the Oak Value Fund (the “Fund”) and its shareholders are best served by focusing our time, resources and capital on advantaged businesses. From this vantage point, we have found that it is much easier to keep emotion out of the decision making.

When asked for our market forecasts, we invariably disappoint. We simply do not attempt to predict the market. Although we know from past experience that when markets change direction, the action can be swift. We do not invest in a way that contemplates catching updrafts or avoiding downdrafts. We focus on businesses. We seek to manage risk the same way that the management teams that run the businesses in the Fund’s portfolio manage risk – through a thorough understanding of the underlying businesses. We do not put our faith in a statistical model that shows we have a 95 percent chance of not getting blown up. We do not ignore the economy; we incorporate what we believe ought to happen over the long term, based on highly conservative assumptions. Within this framework, we look for businesses built on the high ground – those with durable competitive advantages. We place ourselves alongside what we consider to be competent management teams whose objectives mirror our own long-term horizons. Once we conclude that we have an attractive margin of safety, we buy.
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Berkshire Hathaway – Simply put, insurance companies make their money by being paid to take on others’ risk and then investing what they are paid (float) until claims are made or the exposure expires. This is a business where the “high ground” is defined by only taking risk when the price is right and only investing capital when the potential returns are attractive. Success in these activities is highly dependent on having more capital than others when capital is in high demand. Broadly speaking, insurance company valuations were negatively impacted during the quarter by investor concerns over impact of the decline in market value of their investments on their capital adequacy and liquidity. Though shares of Berkshire Hathaway outperformed the overall financial sector, they declined meaningfully during the quarter. The uncharacteristically high volatility of Berkshire shares was due at least in part to concerns regarding a series of long-term insurance contracts (puts) the company has written on various global stock market indexes. As long as global equity markets remain under pressure, there will be headline risk associated with this issue, but we are confident in the long-term value of these contracts. In our opinion, Berkshire remains disciplined in its pricing of risk, opportunistic in its investing and conservative in its capital positioning.
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“One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious” - Sun-Tzu, The Art of War
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Great quote from Oak Value's letter that is worth remembering: “…we are well aware of the potential trap of assuming that the old knowledge is the most relevant knowledge. Just as we attempt to resist the inclination to overreact to short term or most recent information, we must also guard against the risk of being blinded from the present by the shadow of the past.”
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