A great blog post from Philosophical Economics, and a great example of some of the things Sanjay Bakshi stresses, as well as one of the best examples of what Charlie Munger meant when he said: “"...if a business earns 18% on capital over 20 or 30 years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you'll end up with a fine result."
On Thursday, October 3, 1974, the S&P 500 closed at , the definitive closing low of the brutal 1973-1974 bear market. The trailing twelve month PE ratio for the index at the time was . The yield on the 10 year treasury bond was , and the Fed Funds Rate was .
On that day, Wal-Mart Stores (NYSE: WMT) closed at . Its EPS for the prior fiscal year was . Its trailing PE ratio on that number was .
In that same period, Wal-Mart produced a nominal total return of roughly per year. With dividends reinvested, a investment in $WMT went on to become roughly . That same investment now pays more than each year in annual dividends–100 times the initial price.
The reason that Wal-Mart produced a fantastic return from 1974 to now is not that it was cheap relative to its present or near-term future earnings. By the standards of 1974, it was actually a growth stock–priced at almost twice the market multiple. In the current market, an equivalent valuation would be something like or times earnings–for a business with uncomplicated earnings that had already been in operation in Arkansas for three decades. It produced a fantastic return because it was a fantastic business, with miles and miles of growth still in front of it.
Suppose that we put into your pocket and teleport you back in time, onto the floor of the NYSE at 1PM on Thursday, October 3, 1974. You know what you know now, and you can buy whatever stock you want to buy. When the market closes, we’re going to teleport you back to the present, and your $10,000 investment will have turned into whatever it would have turned into, from then until today.
What are you going to buy? If you’re smart, you’re obviously going to buy $WMT–as much of it as you possibly can. You haven’t looked at any other names, therefore you can’t be sure of their performance. Exxon? Coca-Cola? You would equal perform the market. IBM? You would dramatically underperform. The only present-day blue-chip company that I can think of that would have even come close to matching Wal-Mart’s performance is Walgreen (WAG: NYSE). In $WAG, a investment in 1974 would have turned into .
Now, what is the maximum price that you should be willing to pay for $WMT, knowing what it’s going to become? And what sort of valuation would this price imply? One way to answer the question would be to discount $WMT’s total return from 1974 to today at the rate of return of the overall market. $WMT at produced a 40 year annual total return of . It turns out that the price that would bring this return down to the market rate, , is roughly .
In 1974, for a $WMT share would have represented a PE ratio of more than . In the current market, which is much richer, this would be the equivalent of something like times trailing earnings–again for a company with undistorted earnings that has been in operation for decades.
To account for risk and uncertainty, which doesn’t exist for you, but does exist for anyone that’s not traveling through time, suppose that we cut our maximum fair price for $WMT by . Then we cut it in half. Then we cut it in half again. Normalized to the 2014 market, the multiple would still be roughly times earnings. Many people would balk at such a “rich” price–but for $WMT, it arguably would have been, and arguably actually was, the single greatest buying opportunity of that generation.
The next time we see an excellent business trading at 40 times earnings, or 75 times earnings, or 100 times earnings, or wherever, and we shy away, it might help to remember the example of Wal-Mart. High multiples can be entirely justified, provided that the growth potential is real. We definitely should remember the example if we ever come under the temptation to short individual names based on valuation concerns. Nothing is riskier or more imprudent than to short a high-quality business with an uptrending stock price, simply because we think the price is too high. It can always go higher–often, it go higher, for fundamentally valid reasons that we’ve failed to appreciate.