Showing posts with label Garrett Hardin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Garrett Hardin. Show all posts

Monday, December 14, 2015

Links

Garrett Hardin on the Three Filters Needed to Think About Problems (LINK)
Related book: Filters Against Folly
What are Charlie Munger’s views on giving back to society? (LINK)

The Misunderstanding of Peter Lynch’s Investment Style (LINK)

CAN YOU PICK THE GUYS WHO PICK THE GUYS WHO PICK THE BEST STOCKS? - by Jason Zweig (LINK)

Nine Lessons From Third Avenue's Liquidation - by Mohamed A. El-Erian (LINK)

Financial Backtesting: A Cautionary Tale (LINK)

Jordan’s Furniture brings Buffett, ziplines and hooplah to New Haven [H/T Linc] (LINK)

Can Nikesh Arora Make Softbank the Berkshire Hathaway of Tech? (LINK)

How Elon Musk and Y Combinator Plan to Stop Computers From Taking Over (LINK)

TED Talk - Paul Greenberg: The four fish we're overeating -- and what to eat instead (video) (LINK)
Related book: Four Fish: The Future of the Last Wild Food
I've posted some quotes from the book Men and Rubber: The Story of Business in the past, and have some more planned in the future. While I still recommend the entire book if you can find a copy for a reasonable price, I did notice that there now appears to also be an abridged audio version out for those interested, HERE. The same is true of the book Be My Guest by Conrad Hilton, though there are plenty of cheap, used copies available of that entire book. 

Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Missing the forest for the trees...

A few related quotes...

From Garrett Hardin in Filters Against Folly (a book Peter Bevelin mentioned as one of the two things he re-reads every year in his 2007 interview):
It is unfortunately true that experts are generally better at seeing their particular kinds of trees than the forest of all life. Thoughtful laymen can become very good at seeing the forest, particularly if they lose their timidity about challenging the experts. When I speak of laymen ("laypersons," if you prefer) I am talking about everyone, because the expert in one field is a layman in all others. In the universal role of laymen we all have to learn to filter the essential meaning out of the too verbose, too aggressively technical statements of the experts. Fortunately this is not as difficult a task as some experts would have us believe.
From Nassim Taleb in Antifragile:
I once testified in Congress against a project to fund a crisis forecasting project. The people involved were blind to the paradox that we have never had more data than we have now, yet have less predictability than ever. More data—such as paying attention to the eye colors of the people around when crossing the street—can make you miss the big truck. When you cross the street, you remove data, anything but the essential threat.
From Chris Begg:
One of the most limiting biases for individuals attempting to make sense of complex systems is that they are a part of the systems. When you are part of the system it becomes increasingly difficult to see the forest for the trees. Each individual tree’s uniqueness and complexity can lead to confusion and ambiguity. The key is to attempt to step outside of the system and see the forest and trees for the essence of what they are.
From Howard Marks:
Information and knowledge are two different things. We can have a lot of information without much knowledge, and we can have a lot of knowledge without much wisdom. In fact, sometimes too much data keeps us from seeing the big picture; we can “miss the forest for the trees.”

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

Garrett Hardin quote

“The greatest folly is to accept expert statements uncritically. At the very least, we should always seek another opinion. Moreover, to the extent that time allows, we may become a little bit expert ourselves; but we don't have time enough to go far in this direction. (if we went all the way we would become just one more expert, thus moving ourselves to the other side of the debate and leaving the rest of the lay public with the same old problem.)

We need lay defenses against expertise. Fortunately there are such. The most important defense measure is to make oneself sensitive to the biases introduced by the assumptions and methods of experts.”

–Garrett Hardin, Filters Against Folly

Friday, September 20, 2013

Garrett Hardin quote

For all but the last few hundred years of human history the dominant worldview was a limited view: resources were limited, human nature was fixed, and spending beyond one’s income was a sin. This essentially conservative perception prevailed until about 1600. Then science and technology shook the foundations. One presumed limit after another was shown to be, in part, false.
The “Don’t worry” theories of population control amount to a reaffirmation of the religious idea of Providence. Professional publicists know there is always a good living to be made by catering to the public’s craving for optimistic reports. Such behavior finds no justification in the attitude of the Buddha, expressed five centuries before Christ: “I teach only two things: the cause of human sorrow and the way to become free of it.” The present work, though written by a non-Buddhist, proceeds along the Buddhist path—first to reveal the causes of human sorrow in population matters and then to uncover promising ways to free ourselves of the sorrow.
Hearing the Buddha’s statement today many people think, “How depressing! Why accept such a pessimistic outlook on life?” But they are wrong: it is not a pessimistic view if we reword it in terms that are more familiar to our science-based society. Reworded: “Here’s something that isn’t working right. I want to fix it, but before I can do that I have to know exactly why it doesn’t work right.” One who looks for causes before seeking remedies should not be condemned as a pessimist. In general, a great deal of looking for causes must precede the finding of remedies.

Sunday, October 21, 2012

Garrett Hardin quote

This quote can probably apply to the economic world as well.

"The natural world is organized into a web of life more complex than we know. We have only a limited ability to predict what will happen in time as the result of any intervention, however well meant, in the natural order of things. Caution and humility are the hallmarks of the ecolate attitude toward the world." -Garrett Hardin, Filters Against Folly

Thursday, October 11, 2012

Experts and Valdez

Below is an interesting excerpt from Garrett Hardin’s book Filters Against Folly. The important things to keep in mind are: 1) this book was published in 1985; and 2) though the cause of the infamous Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 was related to the pipeline below, it was is another unforeseen accident (a Black Swan?) which caused the damage, when an oil tanker crashed into a reef in Prince William Sound (the ship was coming from Valdez).

Excerpt:

It is unfortunately true that experts are generally better at seeing their particular kinds of trees than the forest of all life. Thoughtful laymen can become very good at seeing the forest, particularly if they lose their timidity about challenging the experts. When I speak of laymen ("laypersons," if you prefer) I am talking about everyone, because the expert in one field is a layman in all others. In the universal role of laymen we all have to learn to filter the essential meaning out of the too verbose, too aggressively technical statements of the experts. Fortunately this is not as difficult a task as some experts would have us believe.

What follows is one man's attempt to show that there is more wisdom among the laity than is generally conceded, and that there are some rather simple methods of checking on the validity of the statements of experts.

The Expert as Enemy

I well remember the summer my wife and I went to Alaska to attend the annual meeting of the Pacific division of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The year was 1969. Because bids were being submitted at this time for oil leases on Prudhoe Bay, many of the sessions of the AAAS were devoted to the possible economic, environmental, and social consequences of drilling oil at the rim of the Arctic Ocean and transporting it across the width of the state. A pipeline would have to be built, so the feasibility of this was also under discussion.

One of the delightful features of science meetings in this American outpost is the wide variety of people who attend. The usual assortment of professors and industry representatives is enriched with politicians, Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos-groups seldom seen at science meetings in the "Lower 48." Discussion in Alaska frequently jumps out of the well-worn ruts.

One of the sessions was concerned with the expected effects of the proposed trans-Alaska pipeline. A lean, intense engineer made a sales pitch for the conglomerate scheduled to build the pipeline. His slide presentation was slick and convincing. The audience was bombarded with turgid tables and computer-generated graphs. The speaker gave the impression that every conceivable contingency had been dealt with.

Nevertheless, one layman was not convinced. This man, who had the rugged look of a modern sourdough, made his points very deliberately. "Let me see if I've got this straight. You say this 800-mile-long pipe, four feet in diameter and completely above ground for most of the distance, will be filled with oil which will be at 190 degrees when it enters tile pipe at tile northern end, right? And that the oil will cool continuously as it flows south, but it will still be 130 degrees, and fluid, when it reaches Valdez. Right?"

"Yes, that's right. Our computer model shows that the oil at Valdez will still be hot enough to flow during the coldest winter Alaska has ever had."

"What if there is some sort of traffic delay at Valdez and the oil has to stay in the pipe for a while, cooling all that time?"

"No problem. If there is a shortage of ships the oil can be held in the pipe for two weeks without solidifying. And remember, we have a tank farm at the south end to act as a buffer for the oil stocks."

“Yes. But suppose all the storage tanks are full, and then there is a tankers' strike that lasts three weeks. What happens then?”

The engineer's reply was cool and prompt: "That's an interesting question."

There is this to be said for the expert's response: it was honest. A politician in the same situation would no doubt have replied with some such words as these: "I'm so glad you asked that question. It gives me an opportunity to bring up another matter of the utmost importance to patriotic Americans, namely . . ." and his well-lubricated tongue would have generated a rhetorical smoke screen that would have eloquently submerged the original question. In blessed contrast, the engineer did not hide the fact that he had no solution to the difficulty.

Indeed, there is no general solution. In trying to picture the real situation, we must set aside the neat computer curves of the engineering analysis and picture a huge pipe that may, some frigid winter's day, be filled with 800 miles of something not too different from the tar of a blacktop road. No pumps in the world can move such a mass through so long a pipe. Even if we had the necessary pumps, the pipe could not withstand the pressure (particularly not the Alaska pipe, in the making of which-as we learned after it had been put in place-there had been cheating on the quality controls).

So what should a pipeline supervisor do when he gets the word, one unhappy winter's day, that the oil flow is going to be shut down at Valdez for an indeterminate period?

If the supervisor did nothing, and the shutdown lasted longer than two weeks, the pipe would become plugged with a viscous and immovable mass. Summer would not cure the ill: the Arctic summer is too short, and the angle of the sun too low to furnish the needed calories. There would be no practical way, ever, to heat the 800-mile pipe enough to make its contents fluid again. To avoid having to build a completely new pipeline, the supervisor would have to open valves somewhere and release the oil before it congealed.

But release it where? The pipe holds more than nine million barrels of oil. Cast you picture the devastation such a large quantity of oil would cause as it flowed out over the tundra? Alternatively, picture what nine million barrels of oil would do poured out over the ocean fishing grounds around Valdez.

Such are the pictures that were missing from the engineer's computer curves. The expert's response, "That's an interesting question," gave no hint of the reality.

Well, the pipeline was built. In more than a decade of operation no serious accident has occurred. But some day we may learn the answer to the citizen's question.

Friday, October 5, 2012

Garrett Hardin and Michael Lewitt quotes (human fallibility, technology)

“You don’t have to be an expert to have a healthy respect for human nature. In fact, laymen often are better at evaluating reliability than are the experts. The expert who looks for “the light at the end of the tunnel” can all too easily end up with tunnel-vision. The layman whose attention is less narrowly focused may be better at taking in the whole panorama.”

“Human beings are the instruments of scientific progress. Technical results are often difficult to understand, but the peculiarities of the instruments—fallible human beings—are both fascinating and understandable by all. In what follows, concern with human nature takes precedence over the details of technology.”

–Garrett Hardin, Filters Against Folly

……….

“Moreover, markets are motored by technology. Money is moved around the world by massive computer power that reduces every form of capital to the same thing – bytes, or 1s and 0s. This leveling of differences is essential to facilitate the flow of money around the world, but it does not come without a cost. The treatment of everything as the same thing conceals the very real differences that lie behind the numbers. Technology creates the illusion that capital is stable and continuous when it is in fact highly unstable and susceptible to abrupt discontinuities. The failure to understand the dynamic nature of capital heightens the risks involved every time an investor takes cash and exchanges it for a stock or bond or tangible asset.

Its stewardship by human beings is what renders capital unstable. Even the most rational human being is highly irrational and driven by emotion. Human beings suffer from a fascinating dichotomy – they live their physical lives sequentially but are endowed with minds that are not bound by time. We live our lives in order but we can think them out-of-order. The ability of the human mind to remember and to imagine introduces an enormously influential element of unpredictability and emotion into human action. An investor’s greatest challenge is to reconcile this dichotomy, which is an ineluctable part of the human condition. And while an investor can try to rely on models that by their very nature simplify reality, he must acknowledge and include in his calculations the incalculable.

Credit is therefore the ultimate human construct. It relies on the past to predict the future. It enlists both memory and imagination. And it is subject to discontinuities that can lay ruin to the best laid plans. Central bank creation of limitless amounts of credit out of thin air is the ultimate human act. But it must be understood for what it is: not something that reduces risk, but an act that radically heightens systemic risk.”