Value Investing World

Thank you Miguel! This video reminded me of Herb Simon and the term 'satisifice' (cross between satisfying and sufficing) that he coined: "Satisfice: To accept a choice or judgment as one that is good enough, one that satisfies. According to Herbert Simon, who coined the term, the tendency to satisfice shows up in many cognitive tasks such as playing games, solving problems, and making financial decisions where people typically do not or cannot search for the optimal solutions." And maybe that same psychology creeps up in people once they have reached some level of success that then keeps them from sustaining that success.

Related previous post: What it takes to be great

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Muhtar Kent on Charlie Rose

The American Spectator: What Would Sir John Say? – By Theodore Roosevelt Malloch

I thought this article was worth pasting in its entirety. The post below was taken from: http://spectator.org/archives/2009/01/08/what-would-sir-john-say/print

What Would Sir John Say?

By Theodore Roosevelt Malloch on 1.8.09 @ 6:08AM

As "annus horribilis" 2008 recedes into the background it might be timely to look back a few years and ask: Who really saw all of this coming? Was such an economic and financial disaster foreseeable? What kind of financial sage would have predicted it three or four years ago, in the middle of the "go-go" years? Well, it turns out there was such a prescient, counterintuitive person, keen of mind and generous of soul. That person himself passed away at age 95 in mid-2008. He was, Sir John Templeton, stock picker of the century, innovator, renowned philanthropist, and always a step or more ahead of the pack…far ahead.

I had the benefit of knowing Sir John and visiting him often where he lived, at Lyford Cay, the Bahamas. I also served on his board of advisors of the John Templeton Foundation. So more recently, in the throes of deepening recession, massive foreclosures, government bailouts, a global stock sell-off, indeed, near financial collapse and all around general -- doom and gloom, I found myself repeatedly wondering out loud the same question: "What Would Sir John Say?" Then I remembered. I happened upon this urgent and wise "Memo" from him, written in June 2005. If only we had all taken it to heart and acted upon it then, how much better off we would be now. Read on:

MEMO

Subject: Financial Chaos

By: John M. Templeton

Date: June 15, 2005

Increasingly often people ask my opinion on what is likely to happen financially. I am now thinking that the dangers are more numerous and far larger than ever before in my lifetime. Quite likely, as we near the end of the first six months of 2005, the peak of prosperity is behind us.

In the past century, protection could be obtained by keeping your net worth in cash or government bonds. Now, the surplus capacities are so great, that most currencies or bonds are likely to continue losing their purchasing power.

Mortgages and other forms of debts are over ten-fold greater now than before 1970. This can lead to manifold increases in bankruptcy auctions.

Surplus capacity, which leads to intense competition, has already shown devastating effects on companies, which operate airlines, and is now beginning to show in companies in ocean shipping and other activities. Also, the present surpluses of cash and liquid assets have pushed yields on bonds and mortgages almost to zero when adjusted for higher costs of living. Clearly, major corrections are likely in the next few years.

Most of the methods of universities and other schools, which require residence, have become hopelessly obsolete. Probably, over half of the universities in the world will disappear as quickly in the next 30 years.

Obsolescence is likely to have a devastating effect in a wide variety of human activities, especially in those where advancement is hindered by restricted bureaucracies or by government regulations.

Increasing freedom of [competition] is likely to cause many established institutions to disappear with the next 50 years, especially in nations where there are limits on free competition.

Accelerating competition is likely to cause profit margins to continue to decrease and even become negative in various industries. Over ten-fold more persons, hopelessly indebted, leads to multiplying bankruptcies: not only for them, but also for many businesses that extend credit without collateral. When this occurs, voters are likely to insist on rescue-type subsidies, which transfer the debts of governments, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Research and discoveries in efficiency are likely to continue to accelerate. Probably, in as quickly as 50 years, as much as 90 percent of education will be done by electronics.

Now, with well over 100 independent nations on earth and rapid advances in communication, people with superior educational backgrounds are likely to progress more rapidly than others. These people with more advanced education are likely to be true innovators.

Comparisons show that prosperity flows toward those nations having the greatest freedom of competition. Especially, electronics and computers are likely to become helpful in all human activities, including even helping persons who have not yet learned to read.

Hopefully, many of you can help us to find published journals and websites and electronic search engines to help us benefit from accelerating research and discoveries.

Not yet have I found any better method to prosper during the future financial chaos, which is likely to last many years, than to keep your net worth in shares in those corporations, which have proven to have the widest profit margins and the most rapidly increasing profits. Earning power is likely to continue to be valuable, especially if diversified among many nations.

JMT/nl

He was, you have to admit, amazingly spot on. But what would Sir John say today in the midst of the greatest recession since the thirties, a global credit crunch of unparalleled proportions and unprecedented market turmoil?

I was with him less than two years ago at the famous Morgan Stanley equity conference at Lyford Cay and he was weak and frail from plain old age. He attended as much as he could because his mind was still sharp, even if his body was in decline. In the final session all the giants of financial services, the hedgies, asset managers, and top fund gurus told a bit about their plans for the future year or so. When Sir John spoke the room fell deafeningly silent, like in those old EF Hutton commercials, you could actually hear a pin drop. When he said he would "short" the financials, autos, airlines, housing, the QQQ, and Wal-Mart it was like a bomb had gone off and people (in this case the largest hedge funds and asset managers in the world) gasped for air. You see, Sir John was not known to normally -- go short. One person who runs the world's largest private equity fund asked sheepishly, "Is there nothing you would buy?" Sir John's quiet but sure answer I will always remember. He said, "No, because nothing is cheap yet, but they will be shortly."

Over his long lifetime Sir John while constantly urging for free markets, competition, spiritual knowledge and moral character would also be searching the world over and buying cheap stocks, and then holding them to sell when they had fully appreciated. He would see this moment, this next year, 2009, I think, as the buying opportunity of a lifetime, not only in the U.S. but also, as was his predilection, in markets around the world. Mark his words and check back in five, ten, or twenty years. And when in doubt always ask, "What Would Sir John Say?"

Jim Grant on CNBC

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

Video: The Drunkard’s Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives

Via Simoleon Sense:

Video: The Drunkard’s Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives

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Book: The Drunkard's Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives

Monday, June 8, 2009

Warren Buffett’s Comments on Inflation

Many well known and respected gurus in the value community – such as Warren Buffett, Seth Klarman, and Jim Grant, to name a few – have mentioned the risk of high inflation that could result from all of the government-led stimulus. In Poor Charlie’s Almanack, one of the bullets under the risk heading in the investment principles checklist says to “Always beware of inflation and interest rate exposures.”

The document linked below is a compilation that I put together of Warren Buffett’s comments on inflation and some of the types of businesses he thinks do well in inflationary times. These comments were compiled from his 1977 Fortune article “How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor”, his annual letters, and also include other commentary that is not inflation specific, but that I thought was useful to review in this context. Any misspellings or misstatements throughout this document are probably from errors I made in the transfer process, and not those of Mr. Buffett.

Link to: Buffett inflation file

Mr. Buffett has occasionally quoted the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does. It is to be hoped that by reading Mr. Buffett’s own words over the years, one can get a little direction in the ark-building process, whether or not the storm turns out to be severe, non-existent, or just a sprinkle.

…..

Excerpts:

From Warren Buffett’s 1981 Letter to Shareholders:

In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.

The first involves companies that, through design or accident, have purchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to an inflationary environment. Such favored business must have two characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.

The second category involves the managerial superstars - men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)

From the Appendix of Warren Buffett’s 1983 Letter to Shareholders:

But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.

Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase – in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.

That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled, it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" – even if both businesses were expected to have flat unit volume – as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of continuous inflation.

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits also must double.

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories. Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of the owner.

Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation. The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large – a need for $18 million of additional capital.

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)

See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25 million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital – over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom – long on tradition, short on wisdom – held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return – rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment – yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting Goodwill – and there is plenty of it around – is another matter. When an overexcited management purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account. Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as if the acquisition had been a sensible one.

From Warren Buffett’s 1984 Letter to Shareholders:

While there is not much to choose between bonds and stocks (as a class) when annual inflation is in the 5%-10% range, runaway inflation is a different story. In that circumstance, a diversified stock portfolio would almost surely suffer an enormous loss in real value. But bonds already outstanding would suffer far more. Thus, we think an all-bond portfolio carries a small but unacceptable “wipe out” risk, and we require any purchase of long-term bonds to clear a special hurdle. Only when bond purchases appear decidedly superior to other business opportunities will we engage in them. Those occasions are likely to be few and far between.

From Warren Buffett’s 2008 Letter to Shareholders:

This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone “all in.” Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone’s guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation. Moreover, major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance, and they will be followed by cities and states bearing mind-boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political challenge. They won’t leave willingly.