Hugh Hendry quotes

From his April 2012 Commentary:
“It is my contention that value does not mix so well with debt.” 
“I do not think it is logical to try and outsmart the smartest people. Instead, my weapons are irony and paradox. The joy of life is partly in the strange and unexpected. It is in the constant exclamation ‘Who would have thought it?’” 
“I attempt to cultivate my own insights and to recognise the precarious uncertainty of global macro trends. I attempt to observe such things first hand through my extensive travel (I promise no more YouTube videos), and seek to understand their significance by investigating how previous societies coped under similar circumstances. But first and foremost, I am always preoccupied with the notion that I just do not have the answer. I am not blessed with the notion of certainty. Someone once said we should think of the world as a sentence with no grammar. If we do I see my job as putting in the punctuation. But above all, my job is to make money. 
In keeping with this theme, I want define the three ingredients that I believe make for an outstanding macro hedge fund manager. These are, in no stringent order:
1. Successful but contentious macro risk posturing. 
2. The need to choose the asset class offering the highest probability of payout should the conviction hold true whilst offering an asymmetric loss profile should the original premise prove unfounded. 
3. A best in class risk technique that stop losses the narrative and responds early with loss mitigation procedures (i.e. a method of staying solvent, rational and disciplined under pressure). 
I have always figured that the first is the real key. That success was simply a matter of contentious macro posturing. In other words, going long very rich risk premium or buying cheap stuff. It is my assertion that what makes a great fund manager first and foremost is the ability to establish a contentious premise outside the existing belief system and have it go on to become adopted by the broader financial community. Bruce Kovner expressed the idea more eloquently when he said, “I have the ability to imagine configurations of the world different from today and really believe it can happen. I can imagine...that the dollar can fall to 100 yen”. I am sure you are nodding in agreement, except Bruce was saying this when the USDJPY was well over 200, not today's rate of 80! 
That is the kind of guy I want to be when I grow up.” 
… 
“Remember, Jesse’s [Livermore] demise was down to [i.e. because of] his shorting of the stock market. Without a doubt, as our transition starting in 2007 testifies to, bearish macro calls are better expressed through the use of fixed income strategies. There is a higher probability that such bets will pay out should the narrative be vindicated. One is long, not short, risk premium and the lower volatility enhances the persistency of the trade.”

John Mauldin: A Gold Standard?

There are times, my friends Michael Lewitt and Dr. Lacy Hunt agreed today at lunch, when the study of economics is best informed by a sound knowledge of history. Indeed, Michael's son wants to follow his father into the finance world, and Michael is starting him off in history. I have spent hours listening to Lacy stroll through economic history, detailing the path of economic thought from Fisher to Kindleberger to Minsky. The last few days have been one of those times when I realized how much I don't know and how much more there is to learn. Not only Lacy and Michael are here in Florida, but a long list of bright minds to learn from. James Rickards, who has recently written the tour de force book Currency Wars, Harry Dent, Doug Casey, Porter Stansberry, Greg Weldon, and John Williams of Shadow Stats, with whom I look forward to meeting (do I have questions for him!). And so many more.

Hussman Weekly Market Comment: Release the Kraken

Over the past 13 years, and including the recent market advance, the S&P 500 has underperformed even the minuscule return on risk-free Treasury bills, while experiencing two market plunges in excess of 50%. I am concerned that we are about to continue this journey. At present, we estimate that the S&P 500 will likely underperform Treasury bills (essentially achieving zero total returns) over the coming 5 year period, with a probable intervening loss in the range of 30-40% peak-to-trough.




Hugh Hendry: The Eclectica Fund: Manager Commentary, April 2012

I’ve seen this in a few places, though none that has allowed printing of the document yet. If I come across one, I’ll try and update the link below.


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April 2012 TEF Commentary

Wired: How to Spot the Future – By Thomas Goetz

So how do we spot the future—and how might you? The seven rules that follow are not a bad place to start. They are the principles that underlie many of our contemporary innovations. Odds are that any story in our pages, any idea we deem potentially transformative, any trend we think has legs, draws on one or more of these core principles. They have played a major part in creating the world we see today. And they’ll be the forces behind the world we’ll be living in tomorrow.




The Man Who Makes the Future: Wired Icon Marc Andreessen

Found via The Big Picture.


Can You Make Yourself Smarter? - By Dan Hurley

Thanks to Barry for passing this along.









Wednesday, April 25, 2012

East Coast Asset Management's Q1 Letter

Found via Market Folly.





Excerpt from The Most Important Thing Illuminated - by Howard Marks

Combating Negative Influences
By Howard Marks,

Author of The Most Important Thing Illuminated: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor

People who might be perfectly happy with their lot in isolation become miserable when they see others do better. In the world of investing, most people find it terribly hard to sit by and watch while others make more money than they do.

Howard Marks: Emotion and ego: A lot of the drive in investing is competitive. High returns can be unsatisfying if others do better, while low returns are often enough if others do worse. The tendency to compare results is one of the most invidious. The emphasis on relative returns over absolute returns shows how psychology can distort the process.

I know of a nonprofit institution whose endowment earned 16 percent a year from June 1994 to June 1999, but since its peers averaged 23 percent, the people involved with the endowment were dejected.

Seth Klarman: Even the best investors judge themselves on the basis of return. It would be hard to evaluate yourself on risk, since risk cannot be measured. Apparently, the risk-averse managers of this endowment were disappointed with their relative returns even though their risk-adjusted performance was likely excellent, as borne out by their performance over the following three years. This highlights just how hard it is to maintain conviction over the long run when short-term performance is considered poor.

Without growth stocks, technology stocks, buyouts and venture capital, the endowment was entirely out of step for half a decade. But then the tech stocks collapsed, and from June 2000 to June 2003 the institution earned 3 percent a year while most endowments suffered losses. The stakeholders were thrilled.

There's something wrong with this picture. How can people be unhappy making 16 percent a year and happy making 3 percent? The answer lies in the tendency to compare ourselves to others and the deleterious impact this can have on what should be a constructive, analytical process.

Joel Greenblatt: This is incredibly important. Most institutional and individual investors benchmark their returns, and therefore most end up chasing the crowd: accent on the wrong sylLABle.

Excerpted from, The Most Important Thing Illuminated by Howard Marks. Copyright (c) 2012 Howard Marks. Used by arrangement with Columbia University Press.

Author Bio
Howard Marks, 
author of The Most Important Thing Illuminated: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor, is chairman and cofounder of Oaktree Capital Management, a Los Angeles-based investment firm with $80 billion under management. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in finance from the Wharton School and an MBA in accounting and marketing from the University of Chicago. He is the author of The Most Important Thing: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor, published by Columbia Business School Publishing.

For more information, please visit Amazon

John Mauldin's Outside the Box: The Pain in Spain

It really does seem to be All Spain All the Time, but there is a reason. Unlike Greece, Spain makes a difference to the eurozone. It may be both too big to allow to fail and too big to save. Last week I came across a very informative 50-page PowerPoint on the situation in Spain from Carmel Asset Management. It is too big to send, but I asked Jonathan Carmel to draft a smaller document with some of the key points. I find it compelling. You can access the entire PowerPoint on my website. If you are not registered with me, you will need to enter your email address and, if you would, your zip code or country. There is a lot if information and data in the report. It will certainly make you think.


Thomas W. Phelps on the kinds of people/managers to look for

“Bet on men and organizations fired by zeal to meet human wants and needs, imbued with enthusiasm over solving mankind’s problems. Good intentions are not enough, but when combined with energy and intelligence the results make it unnecessary to seek profits. They come as a serendipity dividend on a well-managed quest for a better world.” 

-Thomas William Phelps, 100 to 1 inthe stock market

Hussman Weekly Market Comment: Run, Don't Walk



Benjamin Roth quote on investing

From The Great Depression: A Diary, and written in September of 1931:

“The wise investor will disregard the day-by-day fluctuations of the stock market or real estate market and base his buying and selling on these long periods of rise and fall. Above all, and I repeat it again and again—he must have liquid capital in time of depression to buy the bargains and then he must sell before the next crash. It is difficult if not impossible to do this but the conservative longtime investor who follows the general rule of buying stocks when they are selling far below their intrinsic value and nobody wants them, and of selling his stocks when people are bidding frantically for them at prices far above their intrinsic value—such an investor will pretty nearly hit the bull’s-eye.”

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Jeff Bezos' 2011 Letter to Shareholders





How the Fed Favors The 1% - By Mark Spitznagel

A major issue in this year's presidential campaign is the growing disparity between rich and poor, the 1% versus the 99%. While the president's solutions differ from those of his likely Republican opponent, they both ignore a principal source of this growing disparity.

Thursday, April 19, 2012

The Last Great Ape (NOVA)

Broadcast (2007) With their intelligent gaze, human-like posture, and peaceful nature, it's no wonder bonobos—one of five great apes, along with gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, and humans—remind us of ourselves. But while we share a common hominoid ancestor with bonobos as well as 98 percent of our DNA, this unique primate has been largely overlooked by all but a few scientists.


Link

Richard Feynman - The Pleasure Of Finding Things Out

I posted this before, but since it is so good and I saw Tim Ferriss put up a post on it, I thought I'd post it again.


Link

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Warren Buffett quote

“The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.

None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What's required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world: ‘Most men would rather die than think. Many do.’”

–Warren Buffett, 1990 Letter to Shareholders (found via A Few Lessons for Investors and Managers)

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Jeremy Grantham's 1Q Letter: My Sister's Pension Assets and Agency Problems (The Tension between Protecting Your Job or Your Clients' Money)

The central truth of the investment business is that investment behavior is driven by career risk. In the professional investment business we are all agents, managing other peoples’ money. The prime directive, as Keynes knew so well, is first and last to keep your job. To do this, he explained that you must never, ever be wrong on your own. To prevent this calamity, professional investors pay ruthless attention to what other investors in general are doing. The great majority “go with the flow,” either completely or partially. This creates herding, or momentum, which drives prices far above or far below fair price. There are many other inefficiencies in market pricing, but this is by far the largest. It explains the discrepancy between a remarkably volatile stock market and a remarkably stable GDP growth, together with an equally stable growth in “fair value” for the stock market. This difference is massive – two-thirds of the time annual GDP growth and annual change in the fair value of the market is within plus or minus a tiny 1% of its long-term trend as shown in Exhibit 1. The market’s actual price – brought to us by the workings of wild and wooly individuals – is within plus or minus 19% two-thirds of the time. Thus, the market moves 19 times more than is justified by the underlying engines!

…..

You apparently can survive betting against bull market irrationality if you meet three conditions. First, you must allow a generous Ben Graham-like “margin of safety” and wait for a real outlier before you make a big bet. Second, you must try to stay reasonably diversified. Third, you must never use leverage. In my personal opinion (and with the benefit of hindsight, you might add), although we in asset allocation felt exceptionally and painfully patient at the time, we did not in the past always hold our fire long enough or be patient enough. It is the classic failing of value managers (and poker players for that matter) to get impatient and bet too hard too soon. In addition, GMO was not always optimally diversified. We are generally more cautious (or, if you prefer, “more experienced”) now than in 1998 with respect to, for example, both patience and diversification, and at least we in asset allocation always stayed away from leverage. The U.S. growth and technology bubble of 2000 was by far the biggest market outlier event in U.S. market history; we had previously survived the 65 P/E market in Japan, which was perhaps the greatest outlier in all important equity markets anywhere and at any time. These were the most stringent tests for managers, and we were 2 to 3 years early in our calls in both cases. Yet we survived, although not without some battle scars, with the great help that we did, in the end, win these bets and by a lot. Hypothetically, resisting the temptation to invest too soon in 1931 may have been a tougher test of survival in bucking the market. Luckily we, and all value managers, were not around to be tempted by that one. (Although Roy Neuberger – who died in December 2010, unfortunately – was, and he could talk about it as lucidly as any investor ever.)

This exemplifies perfectly Warren Buffett’s adage that investing is simple but not easy. It is simple to see what is necessary, but not easy to be willing or able to do it. To repeat an old story: in 1998 and 1999 I got about 1100 fulltime equity professionals to vote on two questions. Each and every one agreed that if the P/E on the S&P were to go back to 17 times earnings from its level then of 28 to 35 times, it would guarantee a major bear market. Much more remarkably, only 7 voted that it would not go back! Thus, more than 99% of the analysts and portfolio managers of the great, and the not so great, investment houses believed that there would indeed be “a major bear market” even as their spokespeople, with a handful of honorable exceptions, reassured clients that there was no need to worry.

Career and business risk is not at all evenly spread across all investment levels. Career risk is very modest, for example, when you are picking insurance stocks; it is therefore hard to lose your job. It will usually take 4 or 5 years before it becomes reasonably clear that your selections are far from stellar and by then, with any luck, the research director will have changed once or twice and your deficiencies will have been lost in history. Picking oil, say, versus insurance is much more visible and therefore more dangerous. Picking cash or “conservatism” against a roaring bull market probably lies beyond the pain threshold of any publicly traded enterprise. It simply cannot take the risk of being seen to be “wrong” about the big picture for 2 or 3 years, along with the associated loss of business. Remember, expensive markets can continue on to become obscenely expensive 2 or 3 years later, as Japan and the tech bubble proved. Thus, because asset class selection packs a more deadly punch in the career and business risk game, the great investment opportunities are much more likely to be at the asset class level than at the stock or industry level. But even if you know this, dear professional reader, you will probably not be able to do too much about it if you value your job as did the nearly 1100 analysts in my survey. Except, perhaps, with your own assets or, say, your sister’s pension assets.

Warren Buffett quotes (defining what you don't know)

This is a great example of Peter Bevelin pulling complementary quotes together from different Warren Buffett letters to shareholders in his new book, A Few Lessons for Investors and Managers. The book also includes thoughts from Peter that add to the discussion.

“Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult, an analyst - even one who is experienced and intelligent - can easily go wrong in estimating future "coupons." At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways. (1992)

First, we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know. (1992)

If we have a strength, it is in recognizing when we are operating well within our circle of competence and when we are approaching the perimeter. (1999)

Intelligent investing is not complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy. What an investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses. Note that word "selected": You don't have to be an expert on every company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital. (1996)”

Gerd Gigerenzer: What Can Economists Know?

Mentioned by both Steve Keen and Yves Smith.


Link

The Secrets of the Super Creative

The myth of the "creative type" is just that--a myth, argues Jonah Lehrer. In an interview with WSJ's Gary Rosen he explains the evidence suggesting everyone has the potential to be the next Milton Glaser or Yo-Yo Ma.


Link

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Related book: Imagine

Related previous post: What it takes to be great