Thursday, August 30, 2007
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Tuesday, August 28, 2007
Applying Behavioral Finance to Value Investing - Presentation by Whitney Tilson
Common Mental Mistakes
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1) Overconfidence
2) Projecting the immediate past into the distant future
3) Herd-like behavior (social proof), driven by a desire to be part of the crowd or an assumption that the crowd is omniscient
4) Misunderstanding randomness; seeing patterns that don’t exist
5) Commitment and consistency bias
6) Fear of change, resulting in a strong bias for the status quo
7) "Anchoring"on irrelevant data
8) Excessive aversion to loss
9) Using mental accounting to treat some money (such as gambling winnings or an unexpected bonus) differently than other money
10) Allowing emotional connections to over-ride reason
11) Fear of uncertainty
12) Embracing certainty (however irrelevant)
13) Overestimating the likelihood of certain events based on very memorable data or experiences (vividness bias)
14) Becoming paralyzed by information overload
15) Failing to act due to an abundance of attractive options
16) Fear of making an incorrect decision and feeling stupid (regret aversion)
17) Ignoring important data points and focusing excessively on less important ones; drawing conclusions from a limited sample size
18) Reluctance to admit mistakes
19) After finding out whether or not an event occurred, overestimating the degree to which one would have predicted the correct outcome (hindsight bias)
20) Believing that one’s investment success is due to wisdom rather than a rising market, but failures are not one’s fault
21) Failing to accurately assess one’s investment time horizon
22) A tendency to seek only information that confirms one’s opinions or decisions
23) Failing to recognize the large cumulative impact of small amounts over time
24) Forgetting the powerful tendency of regression to the mean
25) Confusing familiarity with knowledge
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1) Overconfidence
2) Projecting the immediate past into the distant future
3) Herd-like behavior (social proof), driven by a desire to be part of the crowd or an assumption that the crowd is omniscient
4) Misunderstanding randomness; seeing patterns that don’t exist
5) Commitment and consistency bias
6) Fear of change, resulting in a strong bias for the status quo
7) "Anchoring"on irrelevant data
8) Excessive aversion to loss
9) Using mental accounting to treat some money (such as gambling winnings or an unexpected bonus) differently than other money
10) Allowing emotional connections to over-ride reason
11) Fear of uncertainty
12) Embracing certainty (however irrelevant)
13) Overestimating the likelihood of certain events based on very memorable data or experiences (vividness bias)
14) Becoming paralyzed by information overload
15) Failing to act due to an abundance of attractive options
16) Fear of making an incorrect decision and feeling stupid (regret aversion)
17) Ignoring important data points and focusing excessively on less important ones; drawing conclusions from a limited sample size
18) Reluctance to admit mistakes
19) After finding out whether or not an event occurred, overestimating the degree to which one would have predicted the correct outcome (hindsight bias)
20) Believing that one’s investment success is due to wisdom rather than a rising market, but failures are not one’s fault
21) Failing to accurately assess one’s investment time horizon
22) A tendency to seek only information that confirms one’s opinions or decisions
23) Failing to recognize the large cumulative impact of small amounts over time
24) Forgetting the powerful tendency of regression to the mean
25) Confusing familiarity with knowledge
Monday, August 27, 2007
Thursday, August 23, 2007
The Effect of Discount Rates on Intrinsic Value
The discount rate you use in a discounted cash flow valuation can have a big effect on an intrinsic value calculation. To illustrate, let's use an example based on the following assumptions:
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Earnings Per Share Year 0: $1.00
Growth Years 1-5: 12%
Growth Years 6-10: 10%
Growth Years 11-15: 8%
Growth Years 16-20: 6%
Growth Years 21-25: 4%
Growth Years 26-30: 2%
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Under this scenario, the net present value of those 30 years worth of earnings is $45.65 using the current risk free rate of 6% (even though the current risk free rate is lower, it is prudent to use 6% as a minimum) as our discount rate.
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However, if we change the discount rate to 10%, the value of that earnings stream is now only worth $26.43. Furthermore, if we bump the rate up to 15%, the net present value is knocked down to $15.40.
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So, discount rates have a big effect on valuation and that means that interest rates (which help determine appropriate discount rates) have a big effect on valuation. And as if that doesn't make things difficult enough, here's another fact: you can't predict interest rates over time.
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This is just further proof of the importance of only purchasing a security (or entire business) when you have a LARGE Margin of Safety between current price and intrinsic value, and it also stresses the fact that one should wait for a fat pitch before taking a swing while investing.
Wednesday, August 22, 2007
Riding Out the Storm with Quality Stocks
Like Warren Buffett, Larry Coats of Oak Value Fund sticks with companies that are understood and valued. Top holding: Berkshire Hathaway
Sticking to the investing principles taught by Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett, Coats buys companies that he can understand and put a price tag on. "This is a great time to be able to say: I know what this business is worth," he says. "It makes it a lot easier to sleep at night."
Coats also likes to find companies that aren't being appreciated in the market. "Our goal is not to eliminate risk," he explains. "It's to identify and understand the pricing, and take advantage of the mispricing whenever we see it."
Sticking to the investing principles taught by Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett, Coats buys companies that he can understand and put a price tag on. "This is a great time to be able to say: I know what this business is worth," he says. "It makes it a lot easier to sleep at night."
Coats also likes to find companies that aren't being appreciated in the market. "Our goal is not to eliminate risk," he explains. "It's to identify and understand the pricing, and take advantage of the mispricing whenever we see it."
Can Benjamin Franklin Make You Rich?
Monday, August 20, 2007
The Effect that Buying with a Margin of Safety has on Your Returns
A little math for a Monday morning:
Buy a stock at 50 percent (1/2) of intrinsic value, sell at 90 percent of initial intrinsic value:
IRR if it takes 2 years: 34.16%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 21.64%
Buy a stock at 67 percent (2/3) of intrinsic value, sell at 90 percent of initial intrinsic value:
IRR if it takes 2 years: 16.19%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 10.52%
Buy a stock at 50 percent (1/2) of intrinsic value, sell at 120 percent of initial intrinsic value (value increased):
IRR if it takes 2 years: 54.92%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 33.89%
Buy a stock at 67 percent (2/3) of intrinsic value, sell at 120 percent of initial intrinsic value (value increased):
IRR if it takes 2 years: 34.16%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 21.64%
It is interesting to note that buying a dollar's worth of value for $0.50 and selling it for $0.90 after 2-3 years, is the equivalent (on a return basis) of buying a dollar's worth of value for $0.67 and selling it for $1.20 after 2-3 years. This a good illustration of why you should require a larger margin of safety for a business that is not growing its intrinsic value, and be willing to pay a little more for a business that is growing its intrinsic value.
Buy a stock at 50 percent (1/2) of intrinsic value, sell at 90 percent of initial intrinsic value:
IRR if it takes 2 years: 34.16%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 21.64%
Buy a stock at 67 percent (2/3) of intrinsic value, sell at 90 percent of initial intrinsic value:
IRR if it takes 2 years: 16.19%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 10.52%
Buy a stock at 50 percent (1/2) of intrinsic value, sell at 120 percent of initial intrinsic value (value increased):
IRR if it takes 2 years: 54.92%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 33.89%
Buy a stock at 67 percent (2/3) of intrinsic value, sell at 120 percent of initial intrinsic value (value increased):
IRR if it takes 2 years: 34.16%
IRR if it takes 3 years: 21.64%
It is interesting to note that buying a dollar's worth of value for $0.50 and selling it for $0.90 after 2-3 years, is the equivalent (on a return basis) of buying a dollar's worth of value for $0.67 and selling it for $1.20 after 2-3 years. This a good illustration of why you should require a larger margin of safety for a business that is not growing its intrinsic value, and be willing to pay a little more for a business that is growing its intrinsic value.
Sunday, August 19, 2007
Thursday, August 16, 2007
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
Wanted: Castles, Gold and Benevolent Rulers
Interview With Gifford Combs, Managing director and portfolio manager, Dalton Investments
Q: Given that context, where are you focused?
Berkshire Hathaway [ticker: BRK.A]. Think of it as the Rodney Dangerfield of companies in America.
The operating businesses are a superb collection that earn more than 25% on tangible net worth. They should be valued at 20 times earnings, or about $70 billion. I value the finance and utility businesses at 1½ times book value -- together they are worth about $26 billion.
The majority of the value at Berkshire is in the insurance entities, which hold virtually all of the investments. The insurance business depends upon the value one places on the $58 billion of "float," which are the non-interest-bearing liabilities of the insurance companies. Adjusting for the float and making allowances for deferred taxes, I value the insurance companies at nearly $200 billion. The total comes to more than $290 billion, or about $190,000 per share. More conservative assumptions about investment returns over time would lower that value; but it's hard to get to a number much below $150,000 per share.
Q: Given that context, where are you focused?
Berkshire Hathaway [ticker: BRK.A]. Think of it as the Rodney Dangerfield of companies in America.
The operating businesses are a superb collection that earn more than 25% on tangible net worth. They should be valued at 20 times earnings, or about $70 billion. I value the finance and utility businesses at 1½ times book value -- together they are worth about $26 billion.
The majority of the value at Berkshire is in the insurance entities, which hold virtually all of the investments. The insurance business depends upon the value one places on the $58 billion of "float," which are the non-interest-bearing liabilities of the insurance companies. Adjusting for the float and making allowances for deferred taxes, I value the insurance companies at nearly $200 billion. The total comes to more than $290 billion, or about $190,000 per share. More conservative assumptions about investment returns over time would lower that value; but it's hard to get to a number much below $150,000 per share.
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
Indecent exposure
"It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked.” That insight from Warren Buffett is being proved true almost every day now. The demise of various hedge funds, the rescue package for IKB, a German bank, the decision of American Home Mortgage Investment to halt operations—all are results of the retreating liquidity tide.
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What we are seeing is a clearing of the froth of the market. Some leveraged buy-outs may not go through; bad news for the profits of private-equity partners, but one suspects they will cope. Investors’ interest might switch from the mid-cap part of the market (where bids seemed most likely) to the large-caps; indeed, this may already be happening.
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What we are seeing is a clearing of the froth of the market. Some leveraged buy-outs may not go through; bad news for the profits of private-equity partners, but one suspects they will cope. Investors’ interest might switch from the mid-cap part of the market (where bids seemed most likely) to the large-caps; indeed, this may already be happening.
Monday, August 13, 2007
Warren Buffett on Diversification - 1966
(from Buffett’s 1965 letter to Partners)
Diversification
Last year in commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of: "(1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.”
This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorrelated (what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.
It doesn't work that way.
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is, “How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight.” It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations - whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.
There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)
Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.
The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.
Diversification
Last year in commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of: "(1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.”
This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorrelated (what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.
It doesn't work that way.
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is, “How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight.” It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations - whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.
There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)
Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.
The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.
A World of Winners, Warren's Way
How does he do it? Author Robert Hagstrom tried to compile Buffett's key investing strategies in his 1994 best-seller, The Warren Buffett Way: Investment Strategies of the World's Greatest Investor. With Hagstrom's book as a source, we at S&P Quantitative Services have put together a stock screen that picks companies using criteria similar to the legendary investor's growth-oriented style. S&P updates this screen on a semiannual basis, during February and again in August.
We have been running this screen for more than 12 years. Since its inception on Feb. 13, 1995, through July 31, 2007, the screen has had an annualized return of 15.69% vs. 9.28% for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index. Year-to-date through July 31, 2007, the Buffett screen stocks outperformed the market, returning 7.69% vs. the 2.61% gain for the S&P 500 (all results are price appreciation only).
We have been running this screen for more than 12 years. Since its inception on Feb. 13, 1995, through July 31, 2007, the screen has had an annualized return of 15.69% vs. 9.28% for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index. Year-to-date through July 31, 2007, the Buffett screen stocks outperformed the market, returning 7.69% vs. the 2.61% gain for the S&P 500 (all results are price appreciation only).
Friday, August 10, 2007
Ben Franklin's 13 Virtues
1. Temperance: Eat not to dullness and drink not to elevation.
2. Silence: Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself. Avoid trifling conversation.
3. Order: Let all your things have their places. Let each part of your business have its time.
4. Resolution: Resolve to perform what you ought. Perform without fail what you resolve.
5. Frugality: Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself: i.e. Waste nothing.
6. Industry: Lose no time. Be always employed in something useful. Cut off all unnecessary actions.
7. Sincerity: Use no hurtful deceit. Think innocently and justly; and, if you speak, speak accordingly.
8. Justice: Wrong none, by doing injuries or omitting the benefits that are your duty.
9. Moderation: Avoid extremes. Forebear resenting injuries so much as you think they deserve.
10. Cleanliness: Tolerate no uncleanness in body, clothes or habitation.
11. Chastity: Rarely use venery but for health or offspring; Never to dullness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace or reputation.
12. Tranquility: Be not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or unavoidable.
13. Humility: Imitate Jesus and Socrates.
He committed to giving strict attention to one virtue each week so after 13 weeks he moved through all 13. After 13 weeks he would start the process over again so in one year he would complete the course a total of 4 times.
He tracked his progress by using a little book of 13 charts. At the top of each chart was one of the virtues. The charts had a column for each day of the week and thirteen rows marked with the first letter of each of the 13 virtues. Every evening he would review the day and put a mark (dot) next to each virtue for each fault committed with respect to that virtue for that day.
Naturally, his goal was to live his days and weeks without having to put any marks on his chart. Initially he found himself putting more marks on these pages than he ever imagined, but in time he enjoyed seeing them diminish. After awhile he went through the series only once per year and then only once in several years until finally omitting them entirely. But he always carried the little book with him as a reminder.
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2. Silence: Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself. Avoid trifling conversation.
3. Order: Let all your things have their places. Let each part of your business have its time.
4. Resolution: Resolve to perform what you ought. Perform without fail what you resolve.
5. Frugality: Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself: i.e. Waste nothing.
6. Industry: Lose no time. Be always employed in something useful. Cut off all unnecessary actions.
7. Sincerity: Use no hurtful deceit. Think innocently and justly; and, if you speak, speak accordingly.
8. Justice: Wrong none, by doing injuries or omitting the benefits that are your duty.
9. Moderation: Avoid extremes. Forebear resenting injuries so much as you think they deserve.
10. Cleanliness: Tolerate no uncleanness in body, clothes or habitation.
11. Chastity: Rarely use venery but for health or offspring; Never to dullness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace or reputation.
12. Tranquility: Be not disturbed at trifles, or at accidents common or unavoidable.
13. Humility: Imitate Jesus and Socrates.
He committed to giving strict attention to one virtue each week so after 13 weeks he moved through all 13. After 13 weeks he would start the process over again so in one year he would complete the course a total of 4 times.
He tracked his progress by using a little book of 13 charts. At the top of each chart was one of the virtues. The charts had a column for each day of the week and thirteen rows marked with the first letter of each of the 13 virtues. Every evening he would review the day and put a mark (dot) next to each virtue for each fault committed with respect to that virtue for that day.
Naturally, his goal was to live his days and weeks without having to put any marks on his chart. Initially he found himself putting more marks on these pages than he ever imagined, but in time he enjoyed seeing them diminish. After awhile he went through the series only once per year and then only once in several years until finally omitting them entirely. But he always carried the little book with him as a reminder.
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Battle at Kruger
What do lions, a buffalo, and a crocodile have to do with investing and business? Pretty much nothing, but it is a good reminder that things aren't always as they seem.
A must see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LU8DDYz68kM
A must see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LU8DDYz68kM
Buffett Is Invested in Rodriguez
Now that Barry Bonds has eclipsed Henry Aaron as No. 1 on the career home run list, baseball and its fans will watch with rapt interest in the next five or six seasons to see if Alex Rodriguez supplants Bonds. One of those fans is Warren E. Buffett, whose position in the financial world is similar to the one Rodriguez occupies in baseball.
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“What’s nice about investing is you don’t have to swing at pitches,” Buffett said. “You can watch pitches come in one inch above or one inch below your navel, and you don’t have to swing. No umpire is going to call you out. You can wait for the pitch you want.”
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“What’s nice about investing is you don’t have to swing at pitches,” Buffett said. “You can watch pitches come in one inch above or one inch below your navel, and you don’t have to swing. No umpire is going to call you out. You can wait for the pitch you want.”
Wednesday, August 8, 2007
Tuesday, August 7, 2007
“Be Fearful When Others Are Greedy and Greedy When Others Are Fearful” - Warren Buffett
Where is there fear? Banks and mortgage-related companies are certainly two areas. Like USG and the quote above, it may again be fruitful to look to the Oracle of Omaha for ideas on where to look for mispriced opportunities.
Unlike other community banks, Bank of Granite has generated profits for more than 50 consecutive years. Famed investor Warren Buffett once called it the “most profitable community bank in America,” drawing worldwide attention to the Caldwell County bank.
After Buffet’s praise, “I had calls from England, Singapore and Tokyo wanting our published financial statements, and we had to hurriedly publish some more because we didn’t have enough,” Forlines recalls
Company Profile: http://www.bankofgranite.com/company_profile.php
*This is not a recommendation to buy or sell a security. Please do your own research before making an investment decision.
Unlike other community banks, Bank of Granite has generated profits for more than 50 consecutive years. Famed investor Warren Buffett once called it the “most profitable community bank in America,” drawing worldwide attention to the Caldwell County bank.
After Buffet’s praise, “I had calls from England, Singapore and Tokyo wanting our published financial statements, and we had to hurriedly publish some more because we didn’t have enough,” Forlines recalls
Company Profile: http://www.bankofgranite.com/company_profile.php
*This is not a recommendation to buy or sell a security. Please do your own research before making an investment decision.
Drywall Maker in Pain as Housing Suffers
When a business is trading at a lower price than several proven value investors (including Mr. Buffett) last bought shares, it is usually a good place to start your research.
USG is such a company and the NY Times recently wrote an short article about the company.
“Business is tough,” said William C. Foote, chairman and chief executive of USG. “The housing recession is entering the second year of what is likely to be a multiyear downturn.”
USG has cut 1,100 jobs during the last year and now employs about 14,000.
In some ways USG represents the reverse of the modern global economy. It faces no significant foreign competition because drywall is too bulky and low-value to be shipped very far. But USG likewise has little opportunity to send its product abroad to countries where home building is not currently depressed, holding the company hostage to domestic construction.
*This is not a recommendation to buy or sell a security. Please do your own research before making an investment decision.
USG is such a company and the NY Times recently wrote an short article about the company.
“Business is tough,” said William C. Foote, chairman and chief executive of USG. “The housing recession is entering the second year of what is likely to be a multiyear downturn.”
USG has cut 1,100 jobs during the last year and now employs about 14,000.
In some ways USG represents the reverse of the modern global economy. It faces no significant foreign competition because drywall is too bulky and low-value to be shipped very far. But USG likewise has little opportunity to send its product abroad to countries where home building is not currently depressed, holding the company hostage to domestic construction.
*This is not a recommendation to buy or sell a security. Please do your own research before making an investment decision.